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Abstract. This conceptual paper analyzes the role of superpowersthat are nationswitha high 
economic-war potential and the ability and expertise to exert influence on many 
geoeconomic regions at global level. Superpowers have a vital role in world systems with 
conflict development and resolution that are directed to achieve/sustain a global leadership 
to cope with consequential environmental threats and/or to take advantage of important 
economic opportunities worldwide. This role seems to generate economic, technological 
and social change and, as a consequence, human development in the long run. 
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1. Introduction  
uperpowers are nations with a high economic-war potential and the ability 
and expertise to exert influence on other geoeconomic regions at global level 
to achieve and/or support their global leadership also with conflict 
development and/or resolutions.  
Superpowers or great powers or leader countries (these terms can be used 
interchangeability) have aa scientific and technological superiority that plays a vital 
role during conflicts (cf.,Coccia, 2015, 2017, 2017a, 2017b; Mendershausen, 1943; 
Smith, 1985). Stein & Russett (1980) argue that the strength of superpowers is due 
to a superior ‚military sophistication‛ that can support the final victory in wars. A 
better investigation of the role of superpowers needs to clarify the war economy 
and consequences associated with conflict development and resolutions 
(‚resolution means to employ behaviour used in similar situations, adapted if 
necessary, so as to obtain an outcome that is good enough‛, Ackoff & Rovin, 
(2003, p.9). In particular, international conflicts guided by superpowers influence 
negatively and/or positively some economic processes in a permanent way. In fact, 
superpowers can develop conflicts to have fruitful socioeconomic consequences in 
the long run (Mendershausen, 1943). Neurath (1919) showed the stimulating effect 
of conflicts developed by superpowers on long-run technical and organizational 
progress of countries (cf., Hirst, 1915, p. 3ff; Kramer et al., 2009). Recently, some 
social scientists have paid more attention to effects of wars driven by superpowers 
on technology and economic growth (cf., Ruttan, 2006; Mowery, 2010; Coccia, 
2018; Coccia, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 
2014c, 2014d, 2015, 2015a, 2015b, 2017, 2017a, 2017b, 2018, 2018a, 2018b, 
Coccia & Benati, 2018; Coccia & Bellitto, 2018; Coccia & Cadario, 2014; Coccia 
& Rolfo,  2010; Coccia et al., 2015). Conflict development by superpowers can 
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support both technological innovations and other types of innovations (Coccia, 
2015). For instance, income tax, an innovative fiscal model, is originated in 
England during Napoleonic wars for restructuring the finance of government for 
military requirements (cf., Gini, 1921, p.205). In general, global conflicts between 
superpowersgenerate major socioeconomic consequences and long-term structural 
change worldwide (Stein & Russett, 1980, p.401; cf., Rasler & Thompson, 1985). 
In particular, conflict development by superpowers generatesdemand- and supply-
side effects for domestic economy and for economies of allied countries. The 
demand-side effects of conflictsare a huge demand shock based on a massive 
increase in deficit spending and expansionary policy (cf., Field, 2008). In fact, 
conflict establishes main technological, economic and infrastructural preconditions 
for an ‚age of high mass consumption‛ (Rostow, 1959, pp.11-13). The demand 
effects generated by conflicts are coupled to powerful supply-side effects: learning 
by doing in military production, spin-off and spillover from military R&D, etc. 
These factors suggest a positive effect of military conflicts on output, productivity 
and technological growth of superpowers and inter-related countries (cf., Baumol, 
1986; Ruttan, 2006). For instance, Wright (1997, p.1565) examines the ‚American 
technological leadership‛ and shows that critical manufacturing sectors for U.S. 
economy have taken advantages from fruitful demand- and supply-side effects of 
conflicts.Superpowers influence profoundly economic systems worldwide and with 
conflict development and/or resolutions can generate economic shocks for 
participants and neutral nations (Goldstein, 2003, p.215). In fact, superpowers, 
developing conflicts, induce R&D investments to produce military technologies 
that are transferred to civilian applications in the long term. The mobilization of 
human and economic resources by superpowers for conflict development increases 
the rates of inventions and technological innovations that in the post-war period are 
diffused to support long-run economic growth (Stein & Russett, 1980, p.412; 
Coccia, 2015)1.  
The consequences of conflict development and/or resolution also play a vital 
role in the distribution of power within international system (Modelski, 1972; cf., 
Levy, 1983; 2011). As a matter of fact, the conflict development and/or resolution 
by superpowers can fundamentally change the hierarchy of power between nations 
in the international system (Modelski, 1972, p.418). Modelski (1972, p.48) asserts 
that the ‚war causes the Great Powers‛, such as Roman Empire over 
200BC  400AD, Britain Empire in the 1710-1850 period, the USA from 1940s 
onwards, etc. (Stein & Russett, 1980).  
Kindleberger (1989, p.203) argues that: The Thirty Years war from 1618 to 
1648, culminating in the economic dominance of the Netherlands, from French 
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars from 1792 to 1815, ending in the Great Britain 
at the apex of the world economy, and the combined World Wars I and II, from 
1914 to 1945 that led to the United States taking over as the world’s leading 
economic power  
Several nations have lost their status of superpower or imperial leadership as 
result of conflicts (e.g. Austria-Hungary in 1918; Italy in 1944; Germany and Japan 
in 1945; cf., Stein & Russett, 1980). Major conflicts between superpowers produce 
changes in the global leadership of world economy and affect ‚hegemonic cycles‛, 
which are longer than 150 years (Kindleberger, 1989, p.203ff; cf., Kennedy, 1987; 
Cipolla, 1970; Coccia, 2018; Olson, 1982). Hence, superpowers, winning 
international conflicts, can achieve and/or sustain a global leadership on wide 
geoeconomic regions (Coccia, 2015, p.203). 
Linstone (2007, p. 115) states that: ‚the winner in each case became the leading 
global power, a new global political economy emerged, and democracy advanced‛ 
(cf., Devezas, 2006; Linstone, 2007a, 2010). In this context, superpowers are: 
‚large-scale political organizations that might usefully be studied as complex 
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systems. But they are also products of their age, and must be examined in the 
context of their time and place‛ (Modelski, 2010, p.1418).  
Modelski (2010, p.1419) also argues that: 
Empires are not the only form of large-scale political organization…. two other 
forms, global leadership (other terms used for it include hegemony – Greek for 
leadership – and global primacy), and ...  global organization… (Britain) is a case 
of global leadership that toward the close of its trajectory exhibited imperial 
features. The United States, too, in relation to the world system, is an instance of 
global leadership. And global leadership can be seen as a transitional form 
evolving in the direction of enhanced global organization. 
Ferguson (2010) notes that after the World War II, the U.S. assumes the global 
leadership, replacing U.K. and ‚shifting from an informal to a formal empire much 
as late Victorian Britain once did‛ (as quoted by Modelski, 2010, p.1419). As a 
matter of fact, Ferguson (2010) claims that the United States is similar to an 
Empire with a military, political, economic and technological leadership worldwide 
recognized. Instead, Modelski (2010, pp.1419-1420, original emphasis) argues that 
the United States have a network-based structure, which is oriented to long-
distance trade in world system: ‚inclining at times to the temptations of ‘informal 
empire’ but in its basically non-imperial organization capable of responding 
flexibly to international crises… its proper name is global leadership, an 
evolutionary, and therefore transitional form capable of adaptation and self-
transformation in response to mounting global problems‛. Finally, imperial 
aspirations with conflict development of superpowers are impracticable in current 
world, which is increasingly global, complex, turbulent, rich, interconnected and 
multilevel; the only feasible strategy of superpowers with conflict development is 
to achieve/sustain a global leadership based on economic and technological 
performances higher than other competitive nations (cf. Modelski, 2010, p.1419ff).  
 
2. A possible relation between superpowers, conflict 
development and human progress 
In general, the conflict development by superpowers has several negative 
effects, but it also seems to have a crucial connection with the progress in 
societygenerated by strategic investments in science and technology to solve 
relevant problems and to achieve/support global leadership (Coccia, 2015). Stein & 
Russett (1980) argue that conflict is one of the engines that propels economic 
change and supports progress in society. The conflict development by superpowers 
appear to be necessary phases for human development, which is not a monotonous 
and linear but rather a disequilibrium process of the dynamics of world system (cf., 
Bobbio, 1965; Gini, 1921; 1959). The conflict development by superpowers can be 
also due to prove military and scientific superiority towards other belligerent 
nations. At the same time, conflict development by superpowers stimulatesnew 
technology and innovation that, after conflicts, can be spread in wide geoeconomic 
regions (Coccia, 2015). In fact, superpowers, under environmental tensions and 
consequential environmental threats, have the incentive to exploit, particularly, the 
newest and less known discoveries and inventions in science and technology (cf., 
Gini, 1921; Coccia, 2015). Hence, the technological progress of societies seems to 
be associated with socioeconomic shocks (e.g., international conflicts) governed by 
superpowers, which generate long-run structural changeon wide socioeconomic 
systems (Coccia, 2015).  
Technological change would be vastly different and economic development 
would be substantially delayed without strategic (also military and defense-related) 
investments for conflict development and resolution by superpowers to 
achieve/sustain a global leadership. In fact, relevant needs and strategic problems 
for supporting the global leadership of superpowers are a strong incentive for 
generating new technology, which supports social, technological and economic 
change (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Role of superpowers in conflict development and resolution for achieving and 
sustaining global leadership 
 
Hence, the role of superpowers in conflicts development and resolution is 
associated with the purpose of global leadership that in the presence of (effective or 
potential) environmental threats can generate new technology and historical paths 
of development (Coccia, 2015, 2017, 2017a).  
Overall, then, superpowerstend to be a vital driving force of social, technical 
and economic change that supports human development in society (Coccia, 2015). 
 
3. Conclusion 
Development and resolution of international conflictsbetween superpowers are 
a major agent of social change with effects on individuals, groups, nations, 
societies and international systems (Stein & Russett, 1980). In fact, Coccia (2015) 
shows that long-term evolution of societies and human development is a process of 
disequilibrium governed by purposeful superpowers directed to achieve/sustain 
global leadership also with conflict development.  
In the context of a World-Systems Theory, superpowersgenerate a power 
hierarchy between core and periphery, in which powerful and wealthy "core" 
societies dominate and exploit weak peripheral societies (Wallerstein, 1974; cf., 
Skocpol, 1977). The role of superpowersis based on dominant capitalist classes that 
want state protection for industry and their control of international trade. In fact, 
capitalists within superpowers want, need, and get the extra-economic assistance to 
satisfy their world market opportunities and maximize profit of international trade 
(Skocpol, 1977, pp.1076-77).  
An economic boundary of superpowers is high expenditures to copy with 
conflict development. The high military expenses can increase public debt, create 
socioeconomic problems and possible economic shocks within superpowers (cf., 
Ferguson, 2003; 2010). Kennedy (1987, pp.539-540) argues: 
To be a great power—by definition, as a state capable of holding its own against 
any other nation—demands a flourishing economic base… Yet by going to war, or 
by devoting a large share of the nation’s ‘‘manufacturing power’’ to expenditures 
upon ‘‘unproductive’’ armaments, one runs the risk of eroding the national 
economic base… maintaining at growing cost the military obligations they had 
assumed in a previous period 
Moreover, superpowersmay assume a worldwide role close to autocracy in 
order to sustain the global leadership with a behavior prone to a permanent 
‚wartime‛ and strains in different geoeconomic regions (Linstone, 2007, p.237). 
Anyhow, superpowerscan also act as a worldwide referee for conflict resolution 
across nations to support geo-political equilibria and stability. Davis et al., (2012, 
p.8) argue that: ‚The United States has an interest in dissuading military 
competition wherever it might arise… U.S. forward military presence displaying 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 5(4), M. Coccia, p.274-281. 
278 
U.S. conventional superiority‛ (cf., Posen, 2003; The White House, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Defence, 2012).  
Overall, then, superpowers have a vital role in world systems with conflict 
development and resolution that are directed to achieve/sustain global leadership to 
cope with consequential environmental threats and/or to take advantage of 
important economic opportunities worldwide. This role tends to generate 
economic, technological and social change and, as a consequence, human 
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